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ABSTRACT 
 
The conventional explanations of currency crises have not proved fruitful .Aykens (2005) proposes a 
social theory of currency crises which he shows is able to account for the interwar gold standard 
crisis. In this paper we explain the elements of Aykens’ theory, propose a brief extension of it and 
demonstrate with respect to currency boards, specifically those of Bosnia-Herzogovina and of 
Argentina both how affective trust is achieved and also how it is destroyed. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
xplanations of currency crises are either policy failure explanations  where crisis in a foreign exchange 
market is the result of domestic policy failure (Flood and Marion (1998); or market power explanations 
which suggest that it is investors who precipitate the crisis which is generated by profit-driven 
speculation. Aykens suggests a new theory –a social theory of currency crises which builds on the network and trust 
literature and which argues that it is changes in trust relations between state and markets actors which is the source of 
the crises. We explain Aykens‟ theory and propose a brief extension to it which more explicitly brings in the role of 
cognitive dissonance. We apply this theory to currency boards and the recent experiences of two currency boards. We 
show that the currency board of Bosnia-Herzogovina has reached the affective trust stage, and identify how affective 
trust was reached and then breached in the case of the Argentinian currency board. 
 
AYKENS’ THEORY 
 
Aykens (2005) argues that changes from low levels to high levels of trust between state and market actors 
embedded in a currency exchange network are able to account for instances of both currency stability and of crisis. 
This takes up Checkel‟s (2001@ p 560-1) that rationalists are unable to model interaction contexts where the interests 
of actors may change. 
 
Leblang (2002) and MacIntyre (2001) have demonstrated that domestic policy-making structures and 
orientations have impact on the investment decisions of market actors. Nevertheless it is difficult to identify situations 
where domestic political constraints inhibited the defence of exchange rate policy. 
 
Aykens‟ theory begins with Cohen‟s (1998, at p. 12) proposition that “money…is a product of self-
reinforcing patterns of market practice and behaviour.” He moves from this to the view of social embeddedness 
theorists such as Uzzi (1996 at p.12) who suggests that the repercussions of continued exchanges among networked 
firms are that  “(T)he calculative orientation of arms-length ties fades and is replaced with a heuristic decision-making 
process that economizes on cognitive resources, speeds up decision-making, and inclines actors to interpret favourably 
the actions and intentions of their network partners in ambiguous situations.” 
 
Foreign exchange markets are seen to be similar to firms embedded in because networks for three reasons: 
first because foreign exchange transactions are concentrated among a few global financial institutions and currencies; 
second, there is a mutual vulnerability to the potential opportunistic behaviour  of investors and of policy makers; and 
third, the complementary resources of state and market actors including money creation, market architecture and 
financial product creation produce mutually dependent global relations. 
E 
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In this theory authority over currency relations is socially constructed through three stages of trust: 
momentary, reputational and affective. Momentary trust is based on risk calculations made from information only 
available at the time (moment) of the transaction. Gradually, as Dasgupta (1998) suggests, reputation is ultimately 
acquired over time through behaviour in well-understood circumstances. Continued compliance with accepted 
behavioural norms leads to the development of reputational trust. A crucial element of this stage is that market actors 
begin to withhold judgement in the face of actions that would have been seen as violations of momentary trust because 
they expect that these actions will move back in the right direction. 
 
Importantly, there is a third stage when affective trust is acquired. Affective trust fosters risk-taking with 
long time horizons and is highly resistant to new information. When affective trust is violated, according to Lewis and 
Weigart(1995 at p.971) “we are morally outraged, not just disappointed.” 
 
A Brief Extension Of Aykens’ Theory 
 
We are able to extend Aykens‟ theory here by incorporating a more developed stage which allows us to 
account more specifically for the precipitous recognition of the moral outrage stance. This requires the recognition of 
the third stage as providing the basis for disaster myopia. 
 
“Disaster myopia” may be defined as the “systematic tendency to underestimate shock probabilities” 
.Guttentag and Herring suggest that there are two factors which determine whether knowledge of an event is 
characterised by risk or uncertainty: the first is the frequency with which the event occurs relative to the frequency of 
stable for a reasonable length of time. The second factor where it relates to underlying economic or financial processes 
is subject to considerable uncertainty which could be reduced by an investment in information and analysis. In 
practice if there is affective trust, proper behaviour is assumed and only real “shocks” will raise doubts. 
 
“Shocks” are defined by Guttentag and Herring 1 ( p.2) as  “events that occur very infrequently and have very 
large potential effects “.Tversky and Kahneman2 (p.64) identify the “availability heuristic “ as a description of 
situations where market actors estimate the frequency of shocks by the ease with which instances or associations can 
be brought to mind. In these circumstances behaviour is unlikely to change even in the face of evidence that the shock 
probability has increased. Cognitive dissonance prevents new information from casting doubt on the wisdom of past 
decisions. .A possible minor event or events escalate to “shock” with very large potential and at first not understood 
effects as unusual activity is not investigated and escalation of information to market actors does not occur. Inevitably 
this leads to a very late recognition of serious problems which by that time will be beyond small corrective actions. 
Moral outrage turns to a withdrawal of trust which has major consequences, as not even momentary trust will now be 
accorded to the failing-trust market actor. 
 
In the next section we show how this theory applies in the case of currency boards. 
 
CURRENCY BOARDS 
 
A currency board is a mechanism for transferring the reputation of a reserve currency to a domestic currency. 
Currency boards have been adopted by Hong Kong (1983), Argentina (1991), Estonia (1992), Lithuania (1994) and 
Bulgaria (1997). Currency boards have been described by Ghosh, Gulde and Wolff (2000) as “the most extreme form 
of exchange rate peg“ short of adopting a common currency. In essence a currency board has the backing of domestic 
currency by a foreign anchor currency and free conversion of the domestic currency into the backing currency. A 
currency board arrangement by definition has to cover a monetary aggregate, but the extent to which it does so 
depends on how the reserves are defined. Using “net reserves‟ is likely to improve the credibility of the system. A 
currency board's reserves must be adequate to ensure that all holders of its notes and coins can convert them into the 
anchor currency. Currency boards often hold reserves of 105 or 110 percent of their liabilities, in order to have a 
margin of protection should the bonds they hold lose value. Currency boards typically make profits of about 1% of 
GDP a year. Using the currency it issues rather then the anchor currency directly captures seigniorage for the domestic 
government. 
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Under a currency board system the risk of inflation is reduced because the government is only able to finance 
its spending by taxing or borrowing which is much more limiting than printing money. The currency board does not 
act as lender of last resort for the economy‟s banks. While failures have been rare in straight currency board systems, 
they have been a concern in countries which have had currency-board like systems. 
 
A crucial element for a currency board system is the enshrining of the arrangements in the central bank law. 
Legal definitions are required for the exchange rate and reserves and for the powers of the managing institution 
specified under the system. It may be, as the rules governing Lithuania‟s currency board specify, that the central bank 
is permitted to appreciate the exchange rate but requires legal action to depreciate it. The central bank should not be 
able to lend to the government under the currency board arrangement because it may affect transparency. 
 
A currency board is a mechanism for transferring the reputation of a reserve currency to a domestic currency 
Table 1 lists the currency boards or similar structures in 2002. 
 
 
Currency Boards And Currency Board-Like Systems As Of June 2002 
Country  Population  GDP (US$)  Began  Exchange rate / remarks  
Bermuda [UK]  63,000  $2 billion  1915  Bermuda $1 = US$1 / Loose capital controls  
Bosnia  3.8 million  $6.2 billion  1997  1.95583 convertible marks = 1 euro / Currency board-like  
Brunei  336,000  $5.6 billion  1952  Brunei $1 = Singapore $1 / Currency board-like  
Bulgaria  7.8 million  $35 billion  1997  1.95583 leva = 1 euro / Currency board-like  
Cayman Islands [UK]  35,000  $930 million  1972  Cayman $1 = US$1.20  
Djibouti  450,000  $550 million  1949  177.72 Djibouti francs = US$1 / Currency board-like  
Estonia  1.4 million  $7.9 billion  1992  8 kroons = 0.51129 euro / Currency board-like  
Falkland Islands [UK]  2,800  unavailable  1899  Falklands £1 = UK£1  
Faroe Islands [Denmark]  45,000  $700 million  1940  1 Faroese krone = 1 Danish krone  
Gibraltar [UK]  29,000  $500 million  1927  Gibraltar £1 = UK£1  
Hong Kong [China]  7.1 million  $158 billion  1983  Hong Kong $7.80 = US$1 / More orthodox since 1998  
Lithuania  3.6 million  $17 billion  1994  3.4528 litai = 1 euro / Currency board-like  
Source of population and GDP data: CIA World Factbook 2001. 
 
 
A currency board for a transition economy is that established in Bosnia Herzogovina where the Central Bank 
began operations in August 1997 at the start of the transitions to a new nation and to a market economy from a 
communist economy. There were four currencies in use at the time-the BIH dinar, the Yugoslav dinar, the Croatian 
kuna and the DM-but only the latter was accepted as a transaction currency. There were 75 very small local banks but 
these were not used by most of the population. 
 
A currency board arrangement was established by the CBBH Law and in the Dayton Peace Agreement. This 
provided a nominal anchor for the currency and a rule-based approach to monetary policy. The CBBH Law specified 
the convertible mark tied to the DM at 1:1 (changed to the Euro at 1.95583 since January 1999); and that the domestic 
currency was to be fully backed with freely convertible foreign assets. 
 
CBBH bears the costs of handling the foreign currency and invests the funds for coverage as deposits in 
foreign banks according to its own business policy on a commercial basis. 
 
Inflation has been low and stable and BAM has become the major transaction currency. Kovacevic (2003) 
accounts for the success of the currency board with four factors. First, the population values a stable currency; second 
there is complete trust in the anchor currency; third CBBH has a foreign governor which has established its political 
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neutrality; and finally, its legal requirements are very specific and independent and make it impossible to extend credit 
and lending to the government. 
 
In Bulgaria, the Currency Board was established in 1997 in Chapter 5 of the Law on the Bulgarian Central 
Bank which fixed the exchange rate of the lev. Only an act of the National Assembly can change the peg. The lev is 
fixed to the Euro. Full exchange cover is required for the total amount of monetary liabilities, that is the aggregate 
amount of domestic liabilities shall not exceed the lev equivalent of gross international foreign reserves. Inflation and 
exchange rate devaluations in the early years of the currency board led to it accumulating excess coverage. The 
currency board was established within the framework of the existing central bank and a government deposit, although 
for sterilisation purposes, is included in its balance sheet. The board is independent and is unable to extend credit to 
the state unless it is against the purchase of SDRs from the IMF. The Governor is elected by the National Assembly 
which also, on his recommendation, elects 3 deputies. The other 3 members are appointed by the President. The 
currency board can only extend credit to banks where liquidity risk has systemic implications and it may only perform 
the lender of last resort function using the minimum reserve requirement. 
 
In the formulation of economic and monetary policies, the government and the board are required to inform 
each other of their intentions and actions. 
 
The Hong Kong currency board arrangements began with the Exchange Fund Ordinance and have been 
continued under the Basic Law.  Until 1988 currency was the only monetary liability of the authorities and bank 
reserves were held at HSBC which at the time managed the clearing house. Between 1988 and 1996 these were held in 
an account HSBC was required to accept on the books of the Exchange Fund. When the monetary base was finally 
defined in the 1998 reforms of the currency board system, it was currency, the aggregate balance of the banking 
system and Exchange Fund Bills and Notes. Reserve funds may be in domestic or foreign currency or gold or silver. 
Liquid $US assets are used. The liabilities to be backed are the Fund‟s Certificates of Indebtedness (Cis). The 
convertibility is set at HKD7.80 =$US1, but only the cash component of the monetary base is guaranteed two-way 
convertibility. It may act as lender of last resort for systemic purposes. 
 
Reflections on these three cases suggest that the degree of independence from the government of the day is 
very much dependent on the enabling legislation and the involvement of the board in a domestic banking crisis 
depends on how the lender of last resort issue is defined in the legislation. The requirement of immediate access to 
reserves and what defines reserves is also very case-specific. 
 
We now consider the Bosnia-Herzogovina Currency Board in the light of Ayken‟s theory and our extension 
of it. As a transition economy with no previous record, the country‟s currency board was initially accorded momentary 
trust by all parties in the foreign exchange market. Following Kovacevic‟s (2003) discussion of its success we can see 
that these factors led speedily to reputational trust and by now have led to affective trust as stability continues to be a 
characteristic of its operations. Market actors assume normality. 
 
Argentina’s Currency Board 
 
We can contrast this situation with that of the currency board of Argentina. The Banco Central de la 
Republica Argentina‟s (BCRA) role as a currency board was established under Article 4 of the Convertibility Law of 
March 1991. Backing assets were freely available reserves defined as gold and foreign exchange reserves. The 
monetary base comprised the liabilities to be backed. Sales of foreign exchange were to be at the official rate with 
purchases of foreign exchange at market prices. The BCRA‟s charter Chapter viii, Article 20 allowed the BCRA to 
finance the national government through the purchase of marketable Treasury securities at market values with a limit 
of 10% on the growth of these holdings and Article 33 added that up to one-third of freely available reserves held as 
ordinary pledge, could be paid in with public bonds at market prices. Further, part of external assets could be kept 
outside the BCRA in the form of interest-bearing deposits on or other investments with foreign banking institutions or 
in low risk high liquidity bonds payable in gold or foreign currency. Although this contributed to profit maximisation 
it implied that reserves were not necessarily immediately available. In the case of a temporary lack of liquidity in the 
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banking system an amount up to the net capital of a borrowing bank could be provided for a duration of up to 30 days, 
with 125% guarantee required. Article 17 (b) and 9(c) allowed the granting of rediscounts and overdrafts to banks. 
 
When a terms of trade shock created a recession in Argentina, the recession created was exacerbated by the 
enforced contraction of the monetary stock by the currency board. 
 
In 2001  the economics minister, Domingo Cavallo who had created the currency board in Argentina, was 
called back into service by President de la Rua, and he then proposed to make the Euro a backing currency in addition 
to the $US. One peso would be equal to $Us0.50 and Euro 0.50. Canac (2003) provides the following table which 
compares the impact of a 40% appreciation of the $US against the Argentine real and a 20% appreciation of the Euro 
against the Euro, under first, the existing convertibility system and, second, under Cavallo‟s proposal. 
 
 
Exchange rates Existing system Cavallo’s  proposal 
Value of peso in reals +40% +30% 
Value of peso in euro +20% +10% 
Value of peso in dollars 0% -10% 
Source: Canac (2003) 
 
 
This table suggests that Argentina‟s loss of competitiveness would have been less drastic under this 
proposal., and overall, its effective exchange rate would not have appreciated as much as under the existing system 
and it would have depreciated 10% against the $US. Its effective exchange rate would have been more stable and its 
terms of trade would not have deteriorated to the same extent. 
 
Reflection on the establishment conditions of the CBRA suggests that changes would not be too difficult. Ho 
(2002 at p 22) noted that “written laws can be changed-sometimes more easily than one would think” and refers in a 
footnote on the same page to Argentina and the modification of its Convertibility Law in June 2001 despite an 
opposition-controlled Senate. This was the change required by Cavallo‟s proposal. Hanke(2002at p.9) is right that 
Cavallo‟s actions “Compromised confidence and credibility” but more because they showed an instability in the 
existing currency board arrangements than anything else. Investors looking at the structure of the currency board 
suddenly became aware of how much influence the government could have on it and this lost it its aura of 
independence. 
 
Gilson (2002) constructs an index of statutory pre-commitment for currency boards to use it as a benchmark 
to evaluate currency boards.  
 
Against this Argentina‟s currency board deviates in a number of ways. First, the BCRA Charter in Chapter 
VIII Article 33 added that up to a third of freely available reserves held as ordinary pledge, could be paid in with 
public bonds at market prices which implied, according to Gilson, that by law only a fraction of the two thirds of the 
reserves essentially satisfied the quality and quantity backing conditions. Further a fraction of external assets could be 
kept outside the BCRA which in Gilson‟s view meant that the condition for immediate access to full reserves was also 
not exactly satisfied. 
 
It is surprising that Argentina‟s currency board was accorded more than momentary trust in the market given 
the number of deviations from the standard model as Gilson (2002) has identified. Overcoming reluctance initially 
was the fact that the market perceived it as simply a “currency board” and did not further inquire into its details. Thus 
the board was able to move from the momentary trust stage to the reputational trust stage quite quickly. Over the 
course of the 1990s as this shifted to the affective trust stage. The changes proposed by Cavallo constituted the 
“shock” which lurched the market from cognitive dissonance to moral outrage. The currency board structure ceased to 
be acceptable to the market actors and this added materially to Argentina‟s problems. There were early signs of 
potential difficulty once the original details of the currency board‟s structure and legislative base were read but it 
seems that the need to read their detail was overcome by the recognition that it was a currency board and the market 
International Business & Economics Research Journal – May 2007                                           Volume 6, Number 5 
 80 
had a clear set of expectations about the performance of a currency board. Only when these expectations were very 
seriously violated by Cavallo‟s actions were the details of the board‟s structure seen as relevant. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
We have set out the elements of Aykens‟ social theory of currency crisis and suggested that the explicit 
recognition of disaster myopia and cognitive dissonance may be useful. Aykens‟ tests his social theory of currency 
crises on the interwar gold standard crisis. In this paper we have sought not only to extend his theory briefly but to 
show how it may also be applied to the situation of currency boards. This clearly places Aykens‟ theory as having 
relevance in current economic conditions. 
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